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Abstract 
Carbon dioxide is an asphyxiant and an irritant gas.  An extreme outburst of carbon dioxide took place 
7 July 1953 in a potash mine in the former East Germany.  During 25 minutes, a large amount of CO2 
was blown out of the mine shaft with great force.  It was wind still and concentrated CO2 accumulated 
in a valley leading to multiple asphyxiation casualties.  Based on a review of concentration-response 
relationships, the location of victims, and other information, it is concluded that concentrations of 10-
30% carbon dioxide may have occurred 450 m from the point of release for at least 45 minutes.  It is 
concluded that 1,100-3,900 tonnes of CO2 were blown out of the mine shaft, possibly with intensities 
around 4 tonnes per second.  It is also concluded that the large majority of the gas escaped as a near-
vertical high-velocity jet with only little loss of momentum due to impingement.  The release was 
modelled using PHAST.  Output from the model is inconsistent with the asphyxiation harm observed.  
The high-momentum release is predicted to disperse safely and never reach the ground.  Carbon dioxide 
capture and storage (CCS) schemes will involve handling and transportation of unprecedented 
quantities of CO2.  Case histories to date include sudden releases of CO2 of up to 50 tonnes only, far too 
small to provide a suitable empirical perspective on predicted hazard distances for CCS projects.  The 
1953 outburst contributes to filling this gap.   
 
Keywords: Carbon dioxide accident, toxicology, asphyxiation fatality, jet dispersion modelling 
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Research highlights 
• A forceful accidental outburst of 1,100-3,900 tonnes of CO2  is analyzed 
• The CO2 accumulated in a valley and led to asphyxiation fatalities 
• Dispersion modelling predicts that the high-momentum release would dilute safely 
•  Predicted concentration contours cannot explain the asphyxiation harm observed 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Carbon dioxide 
Carbon dioxide can exist as a gas, liquid, solid (dry ice) or supercritical fluid, 
depending on its temperature and pressure.  The expression dense phase CO2 is 
often used as a collective term for describing supercritical or liquid phase CO2. 
(DNV 2008).   
Gaseous carbon dioxide is odourless, colourless and often regarded as non-
toxic and inert.  It may act as a simple asphyxiant displacing the oxygen re-
quired to sustain life.  It can accumulate in low-lying areas since it is 1.6 times 
denser than regular air.   
  Because of its extensive use and production, the hazards of CO2 are well 
known and routinely managed (Benson et al. 2002) 
The supply chain handles high purity commercial liquid CO2 in refrigerated and 
pressurized tanks, typically at -30 °C and 15 barg.  To give a sense of magni-
tude and scale, the North-European market is supplied by ships with capacities 
of 900-1,200 tonnes  (Berger et al. 2004).  Market participants inform us that 
the standard storage tank capacity is 330 tonnes and that terminals typically 
have 3-5 tanks, i.e. a storage capacity of about 1,000-1,500 tonnes. Very few 
consumer sites have storage capacities in excess of 50 tonnes, often much less. 
1.2 Accident history 
Pressurized storage vessels holding liquid carbon dioxide have been a source of 
several major accidents (Table 1).  Clayton and Griffin (1995) did extensive 
research to obtain information on CO2 vessels that had ruptured. They con-
cluded that while the overall safety record of carbon steel storage vessels had 
been good, some accidents had been caused by low-temperature damage due to 
auto-refrigeration.   
Lampe and Schattka (2010) report a 2008 incident involving the malfunction of 
an industrial fire suppression system in a large warehouse with flammable 
paints and solvents located in a mixed industrial/residential area in Mönchen-
gladbach (Germany).  The fire suppression system released about 50 tonnes of 
carbon dioxide inside the warehouse.  The release took place Saturday in the 
early morning hours, under a meteorological inversion condition.  There were 
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no employees present on the premises and fire fighters who entered the build-
ing did so with self-contained breathing apparatus due to the asphyxiation risk.  
Outside the warehouse however, several fire fighters collapsed due to oxygen 
deficiency and 14 citizens collapsed on the nearby public road, including one 
motorcyclist who fell off his bike.   
A natural disaster involving a large release of carbon dioxide took place in 
Lake Nyos (Cameroon) in 1986.  Due to an unusual combination of factors it is 
possible for carbon dioxide of volcanic origins to accumulate slowly as a dis-
solved gas in the dense saline lower strata of the lake, eventually leading to a 
highly unstable situation.  In 1986 a sudden eruption of carbon dioxide from the 
lower strata took place.  The amount released may have been up to 1.5 million 
tonnes.  The denser than air plume of carbon dioxide followed the natural to-
pographic depressions of the land, travelling up to 25 km and killing an esti-
mated 1,700 people and large numbers of livestock. 
 
Location Year CO2 amount Release type Hazard Fatalities Source 
Ireland  1986 15 tonnes High-momentum  Pressure vessel failure 
(brewery) 
0 Clayton and 
Griffin (1995) 
Sweden  1960 25 tonnes High-momentum  Pressure vessel failure unknown Clayton and 
Griffin (1995) 
Worms  
(Germany)  
1988 30 tonnes High-momentum  Pressure vessel failure, 
(foods/drinks industry), 
blast damage, tank frag-
ments hurled more than 
300 m 
3 Clayton and 
Griffin (1995) 
Italy  unknown 50 tonnes High-momentum  Pressure vessel failure unknown Clayton and 
Griffin (1995) 
Mönchen-
gladbach 
(Germany)  
2008 50 tonnes, fire 
extinguishing 
system 
Low-momentum  Asphyxiation. Citizens 
collapse on nearby public 
road, probably 50-100 m 
0 Lampe and 
Schattka, 
(2010) 
Lake Nyos,  
(Cameroon) 
1986 up to 1.5 million 
tonnes 
Low-momentum  Asphyxiation, plume 
travels up to 25 km 
1,700 Kling et al. 
(1987) 
Table 1 Examples of accidents involving major releases of carbon dioxide.  The extreme Lake Nyos 
disaster, is the only recorded instance of a sudden release of carbon dioxide above 50 tonnes. 
 
1.3 New technologies involving large amounts of CO2  
Carbon (dioxide) capture and storage (CCS) schemes aim to store CO2 perma-
nently in deep geological formations due to concerns over greenhouse gas 
emissions.   Natural gas from the Snøhvit gas field in Norway contains 5-8 % 
CO2, which is separated and injected into a formation below the gas field.  In-
jection began in 2008 and will eventually amount to 2,000 tonnes per day (NPD 
2010).  The proposed Barendrecht project in The Netherlands involves injecting 
about 1,100 tonnes of CO2 per day from a nearby refinery into a depleted gas 
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reservoir (Molag 2009).  The amount handled per day in these projects is 
roughly similar to the storage capacity of an existing large CO2 terminal.  Sig-
nificantly larger quantities may be handled if, or when, CCS expands into 
power generation.  The planned FutureGen project in the USA involves injec-
tion of up to 6,800 tonnes per day from a 275 MW coal gasification power sta-
tion (DoE 2007).  Capturing emissions from a single standard 1,000 MW 
coal‐fired power plant will require handling of 30,000 tonnes CO2 per day 
(Price et al. 2007).  In any case, CCS schemes will involve handling and trans-
portation of CO2 on a hitherto unprecedented scale and magnitude.   
Transmission pipeline risk studies have assumed that block valves would close 
in the event of pipeline damage and limit the released quantity to the inventory 
of a single pipeline section.  To give a sense of magnitude and scale a severed 
19” pipeline section 8 km long may release 1,300 tonnes of carbon dioxide in 
about 3-4 minutes.  A worst-case hazard analysis for the FutureGen project 
suggests that acute life threatening concentrations, defined as exceeding 7% 
CO2, may occur within 70 m of the point of release and that no serious threat to 
human health exists beyond 200 m, see Table 2.   The predictions of other stud-
ies are more optimistic.  Molag (2009) defines concentrations in excess of 10% 
harmful, and states that it is highly unlikely that such high concentrations will 
occur in the event of a pipeline accident.  A photo of a Dutch residential area in 
the vicinity of an existing CO2 pipeline is included, presumably to underline the 
suggestion that an accidental release is unable to cause harm.  Indeed, propo-
nents of the Dutch Barendrecht project argue that it is safe; CO2 is not poison-
ous and cannot explode (WSJ 20090421).   
Planned pipeline Release  CO2 hazard range (m)  
a
 
Name Diameter 
(inch) 
Section 
length  
(km) 
Inventory  
(tonnes) 
rate  
(tonnes per 
second) 
duration  
(seconds) 
Fatality likely 
(>7 vol%) 
No life threat 
(<4 vol%) 
No serious  
effect 
(< 3 vol%) 
Mattoon  14.4” 0.8 72.3 4.4 16 <1 < 1 < 1 
Tuscola  14.4” 8 723 4.4 162 47 96 140 
Jewett  19.3” 8 1,290 8.0 162 66 136 202 
Odessa  12.8” 8 568 3.5 162 41 82 121 
Table 2 Transmission pipeline risk study considers the sudden releases of up to 1,300 tonnes of carbon 
dioxide.  No life threat exists beyond 140 m.  Source: DoE (2007) 
a  Worst case estimated distance to “no life threatening effects” (4 vol% CO2 (TEEL-3) and “no 
serious or irreversible effects “ 3 vol% CO2 (TEEL-2).  The gas was assumed to escape as a 
horizontal jet at ground level and modelled in SLAB, a hazardous air dispersion model approved 
by the U.S. EPA.   
 
These predictions are largely based on expected jet dilution effects.  CO2 re-
leased from a high-pressure source would develop a velocity up to the speed of 
sound and entrain a quantity of air of many tens of times its own weight.  Maz-
zoldi et al. (2009) report a theoretical study in which computational fluid dy-
namics (CFD) tools were used.  Their study case on the release of 1,800 kg/s 
CO2 perpendicular to the wind direction for 10 minutes is particularly instruc-
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tive.  If no jet dilution takes place, i.e. the release velocity is 0 m/s, the maxi-
mum downwind distance to 10 vol% is estimated at about 850 m.  For a near-
horizontal jet with a relatively modest release speed of 49 m/s, just about one 
fifth of the sonic velocity, the maximum downwind distance to 10 vol% is es-
timated to be only 50 m.   
Methodological choices and assumptions abound in hazard analysis.  Koorn-
neef et al. (2009) examine nine published risk studies and report a considerable 
variation in computed hazard distances; they conclude that further validation of 
release and dispersion models is necessary.   
Comparison with observed consequences of actual large-scale energetic re-
leases of CO2 may provide an empirical perspective on model predictions.  
There is a gap however, as reported accident cases comprise releases in the 
range of tens of tonnes only, none in the range of hundreds or thousands of ton-
nes.  The 7 July 1953 outburst in Menzengraben contributes to filling this gap. 
1.4 CO2 dangers in potash mining 
Carbon dioxide is a well known mining hazard and responsible for the lives of 
countless miners.  For example, in Lower Silesia, major carbon dioxide disas-
ters took place in the Wenzeslaus coal mine near Jugów (Hausdorf) 9 July 1930 
with the loss of 151 lives, and 10 May 1941 in the Ruben coal mine near Nowa 
Ruda (Neurode) with 187 miners killed (Farrenkopf 2002); both locations now 
in Poland, then in Germany.  Outbursts of carbon dioxide have been reported in 
evaporite (potash) mines worldwide.  The salt mines of the Werra district of the 
former German Democratic Republic (DDR) are unique for the presence of 
large quantities of CO2 (Müller 1958).  The most frequent and largest CO2 out-
bursts on record have taken place there (Ehgartner et al. 1998).   
Potash is extracted for its content of potassium, an important plant nutrient.  
The evaporite deposits of the Werra district are thought to have formed some 
200 million years ago when the land was closer to equator.  Sections of the sea 
were cut off from the ocean and evaporation exceeded inflow.  Over time, the 
increasingly concentrated brine receded to smaller basins within natural depres-
sions in the terrain and salts would eventually begin to precipitate according to 
their inability to stay in solution, known as a precipitation sequence.  Because 
potassium salts are generally highly soluble they would be naturally concen-
trated and precipitate last in relatively small areas with respect to the size of the 
original seas.  Finally, the deposits were overlaid with other material, protecting 
them from weathering and taken to their present location by tectonic forces 
(Fite 1951).  Selected important evaporite minerals are: NaCl (halite), KCl 
(sylvite) and KCl·MgCl2·6H2O (carnallite). 
A period of basaltic volcanism took place 14-25 million years ago shaping the 
appearance of the Werra district today with ridges and cone-shaped mountains 
of volcanic origins.  Volcanic basalt rose through the mantle through local fault 
lines and basalt pipes, penetrating the evaporite deposits.  The rising basalt 
created pathways for volcanic carbon dioxide and water, to impregnate nearby 
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evaporite deposits and leading to complex local re-dissolution processes that 
can transform and redistribute salts.  For example, magnesium chloride is 
thought to leach out of carnallite (Hoppe 1960), possibly with a volume loss of 
up to  50% (Zapp and Lindloff 2003), leading to pore formation where other 
salts subsequently may precipitate or CO2 be trapped.  This particular leaching 
process increases the potassium content of the original carnallite and may 
eventually transform it into a bluish secondary sylvite mineral, in German 
known as Umwandlungssylvinit, potentially with abundant gas inclusions.  
Seams of Umwandlungssylvinit have been a source of extreme carbon dioxide 
outbursts (Gimm 1954, Marggraf 1971). 
Due to the lithostatic pressure of the overburden, entrapped carbon dioxide will 
be in its dense phase.  Liquid carbon dioxide has seeped into mine tunnels 
forming flakes of dry ice or has escaped violently, producing sounds compared 
to machine gun fire (Müller 1958).  An outburst is a sudden violent expulsion 
of gas and salt leading to cavity formation.  The likely outburst mechanism is 
shown in Figure 1.  The sudden explosive depressurization of entrapped CO2 is 
thought to lead to a chain reaction expelling a mixture of gas and fractured salt 
from an inward-moving expulsion front.  The cavity may branch out and ex-
pelled salt from upper cavities may bury and hide the existence of lower cavi-
ties (Duchrow 1959; Duchrow et al. 1988).  As reported by Marggraf (1971) 
the resulting temperature drop is modest, only about 4 °C, and the carbon diox-
ide gas may attain velocities in excess of 200 m/s and the expelled salt approx 
50 m/s.  An outburst can unleash forces with great destructive potential.  A four 
tonnes salt boulder has been moved 60 m down a tunnel and a heavy duty drill-
ing vehicle weighing 11.3 tonnes has been overturned and displaced 145 m 
(Duchrow 1997).  Blasting work was known to be able to trigger major out-
bursts.  Consequently, gas-tight safety chambers were built where miners pre-
emptively took refuge during blasting.  In 1938, two miners in a safety chamber 
overheard the completion of the blasting sequence.  Upon leaving “they sud-
denly heard howling and roaring winds, like the most severe storm, and the 
noise of overturned conveyor cars coming tumbling down the tunnels.  They 
immediate returned to the chamber.” (Müller 1958:66). 
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Figure 1 Suggested CO2 outburst mechanism when a potash seam excavation 
face approaches a CO2-rich deposit. Based on: Duchrow et al. 1988    
 
 
To give a sense of magnitude and scale, selected outbursts are presented in Ta-
ble 3.  While major outbursts took place in most mines, the Menzengraben 
mine was particularly affected.  The consequences were also more severe be-
cause the Menzengraben mine had a relatively small volume with respect to the 
outburst size, much smaller than other mines (Junghans 1953b).  
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Date Mine salt burst 
(tonnes) 
CO2 released 
(m
3
) 
Source 
1908.11.27 Dietlas 2,700 18,000 (a) 
1938.04.15 "Marx-Engels" 7,000 not stated (a) 
1938.12.31 "Ernst Thälmann" 15,000 200,000 (a) 
1942.01.29 Menzengraben 5,000 75,000 (a) 
1943.06.03 Menzengraben 18,000 450,000 (a) 
1950.05.10 "Marx-Engels" 20,000 not stated (a) 
1951.10.13 Menzengraben 13,000 200,000 (a) 
1953.07.07 Menzengraben 65,000 700,000 (a) 
1957.10.15 Menzengraben 22,000 400,000 (a) 
1981.08.21 not stated 6,000 1,000,000 (b) 
1984.5.25 not stated 110,000 2,300,000 (b) 
Table 3 Selected reported carbon dioxide outbursts in the Werra district.  As 
discussed later in text, early CO2 amounts are probably not based on 
measurements.  Sources: (a) Hoppe 1960:109, (b) Duchrow et al. 
1988:247 
 
The outburst hazard was eventually controlled using a combination of pre-
emptive evacuations prior to blasting, automatically closing heavy duty drop 
doors to retard depressurization and attenuate destructive gas velocities in the 
tunnels, powerful ventilation equipment, communication devices, safety cham-
bers and prognosis drilling resulting in little loss of life.   
The 1953 outburst in the Menzengraben mine may be the world’s largest in 
terms of cavity size (Ehgartner et al. 1998).  The largest outburst on record 
known to the author took place in 25 May 1988 and lead to the expulsion 2.3 
mio. m3 CO2 (Duchrow et al. 1988).  The mine is not named but can be inferred 
to be in the Werra district.  
The 1953 outburst led to high concentrations of CO2 in the valley.  The actual 
extent of the gas cloud and the concentrations involved are unknown but may 
be inferred from the location of victims, the observed harm and concentration-
response relationships.  Because rescue parties were deterred from approaching 
the scene it is also relevant to review warning properties and possible means of 
detecting dangerous concentrations. 
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2 Carbon dioxide toxicity 
2.1 Acute CO2 toxicity thresholds 
Generally accepted concentration-effect relationships can be found in the rec-
ommended standards for occupational exposure to carbon dioxide (e.g. NIOSH 
1976).   Exposure to 4–5% CO2 for a few minutes leads to headache, dizziness, 
and unpleasant dyspnoea (difficulty of breathing).  Exposure to 7-10% for sev-
eral minutes to an hour results in headache, increased heart rate, shortness of 
breath, dizziness, sweating, rapid breathing, and near or full unconsciousness.    
Dizziness, drowsiness, severe muscle twitching, and unconsciousness occur 
after one to several minutes exposure to 10–15%.  Above 15%, loss of con-
sciousness occurs in less than one minute.  Death occurs within minutes at 
30%.  Carbon dioxide acts as a potent cerebral vasodilator, which may explain 
many of the symptoms associated with carbon dioxide toxicity, including head-
ache, dizziness and narcosis (Benson et al. 2002). 
The CO2 concentration endpoints used in earlier risk studies wary.  Mazzoldi et 
al. (2008) take 0.2% and 1.5% as “levels of concern”, and 7% as the limit 
above which “human fatality is likely to occur”.  A US study (DoE 2007) cites 
Temporary Emergency Exposure Limits (TEEL) defined by the US DoE of 
which TEEL-1 = 3% (adverse), TEEL-2 = 3% (irreversible adverse), and 
TEEL-3 = 4% (life threatening).  Aines et al. (2009) also use TEEL-2 and 
TEEL-3 values.   
The Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) value defined by US 
NIOSH is currently 4%, i.e. similar to TEEL-3 (NIOSH 1994).  .  The TEEL 
and IDLH values appear to be cautiously defined; or more precisely: they may 
attempt to define protection from harm rather than harm itself, based on un-
stated safety factors.  Risk studies from The Netherlands use so-called probit 
functions based on the assumption that 4 hours exposure to 10% results in 1% 
lethality and 5 minutes exposure to 20% results in 99% lethality (Koornneef et 
al. 2009). 
Studies on long-term exposure to elevated levels of CO2 for submarine, aircraft 
and manned spacecraft operations provide an illuminating perspective on TEEL 
and IDLH values.  Healthy individuals can tolerate continuous inhalation of 3% 
(i.e. TEEL-2 “irreversible adverse”) for at least one month and 4% (i.e. IDLH 
“immediately dangerous”) for over a week (Glatte et al. 1967, Lambertsen 
1971).  When exposed to 6% for 16 minutes, many test subjects reported a sub-
The extreme carbon dioxide outburst at the Menzengraben potash mine 7 July 1953 
C:\Documents and Settings\fhhe\My Documents\Frank\Artikler\01 Menzengraben\Safety Science\Menzen-53 submit (to Orbit).docx 
12 
.  
jective feeling of difficulty in doing a card sorting exercise but objectively there 
was no deterioration in their performance, and more than two-thirds believed 
the CO2 would not influence their ability to drive a car or pilot a plane safely 
(White et al. 1952).  Above 7 % both objective and subjective effects (dyspnoea 
and mental impairment) become progressively more pronounced (Lambertsen 
1971).  
Unconsciousness inevitably occurs at 15% or higher.  20 or 30% induces unco-
ordinated neuromuscular response and generalized epileptiform convulsions.  
Exposure to 30 % can lead to unconsciousness in less than 30 seconds and con-
vulsions within one minute (Lambertsen 1971).   
2.2 Warning properties and means of detection  
While the US NIOSH confined space hazard classification system defines car-
bon dioxide as a nontoxic, inert gas that displaces oxygen required to sustain 
life, exposure to elevated concentrations has significant physiological effects 
before oxygen dilution could be significant (Benson et al. 2002).   One such 
effect is respiratory compensation as carbon dioxide dissolved in the blood 
stimulates the breathing control centre in the brain.  Respiratory stimulation 
becomes particularly marked when the concentration exceeds 3%, which is 
considered the threshold at which most individuals become aware of the effect.  
The average volume breathed during one minute increases from 7 litres at 
0.03% carbon dioxide to 9 litres at 2%, 11 litres at 3%, 26 litres at 5%, and 77 
litres, i.e. a ten-fold increase, at 10% (Benson et al. 2002, Lambertsen 1971).  
Simple calculation yields that a concentration of 10% carbon dioxide in regular 
air corresponds to an oxygen concentration of about 19%, i.e. well above the 
lower limit for oxygen deficit (hypoxia) effects, which is 16% oxygen (NIOSH 
2004).  Severe symptoms of laboured breathing will thus be experienced before 
effects of oxygen deprivation set in.  
Carbon dioxide dissolves in the moisture of the mucous membranes of the eyes 
and the respiratory tract producing carbonic acid, a membrane irritant.  Because 
carbon dioxide is only modestly soluble in water, relatively high concentrations 
are required to produce irritation.  The upper airways are innervated by both the 
first cranial (olfactory) and fifth cranial (trigeminal) nerves, mediating the sen-
sations of olfaction and mucous membrane irritation, respectively.  Trigemi-
nally mediated sensations, notably nose and throat irritation, are important in 
the study of air-pollution-related health complaints (Shusterman et al. 2001).  
Carbon dioxide, being both odourless and a membrane irritant, is useful in tests 
of nasal trigeminal chemoreception sensitivity because it provides no olfactory 
cue to the test subjects.  The lower detection threshold seems to be about 15% 
(Shusterman et al. 2001) with a median value of 28 % (Shusterman and Balmes 
1997).  Severe CO2 poisoning effects, including laboured breathing, will there-
fore occur before sensory warning from mucous membrane irritation becomes 
apparent. 
Talks with retired miners from the Menzengraben area revealed an unexpected 
means of detection.  When asked how they would know if they accidentally 
The extreme carbon dioxide outburst at the Menzengraben potash mine 7 July 1953 
C:\Documents and Settings\fhhe\My Documents\Frank\Artikler\01 Menzengraben\Safety Science\Menzen-53 submit (to Orbit).docx 
13 
.  
ventured into mine tunnels with high concentrations of CO2, invariably their 
first response was that CO2 was odourless.  However, because it is denser than 
air, concentrations at ground level could be very high while still being breath-
able for an individual standing upright.  Independently, miners said that this 
produced a distinct feeling of warmth around the lower extremities.  A miner 
told of the horror of walking “in hot water”, whilst rushing to safe higher levels 
after a sudden carbon dioxide outburst.  No literature has been identified, de-
scribing the phenomenon.  In the Lake Nyos disaster, survivors reported a sen-
sation of warmth before losing consciousness, which the investigators dis-
missed as hallucinatory (Kling et al. 1987).  In old medical literature, there is 
sporadic mention of an atmosphere of carbon dioxide surrounding an area of 
skin giving a sensation of warmth (e.g. Howell and Bowditch 1901)1.  Because 
CO2 gas has a lower thermal conductivity than air it could be speculated simply 
to act as an insulator.2   
Retired miners also recalled that they had a burning lamp on a line.  On sus-
pecting the presence of CO2, e.g. upon experiencing laboured breathing or a 
sensation of warmth, they would lower the lamp near to the ground.  If the 
flame flickered or went out concentrations would be dangerously high.  The 
theoretical minimum carbon dioxide concentration for extinguishment of higher 
paraffins is 28% (NFPA 12, 2005).  The lamp test is thus only capable of de-
tecting of very high concentrations that would cause rapid loss of conscious-
ness.3  Miners believed that a single breath of concentrated CO2 could lead to 
collapse, and once down, death would ensue rapidly. 
2.3 Exposure to extreme concentrations  
Severe irritation of the mucous membrane may trigger reflex nerve arcs, which 
act protectively against respiratory tract irritation.  The reflex is produced 700-
800 ms after inhaling a critical concentration of CO2 i.e. before the stimulus 
reaches the lungs (Dunn et al. 1982).  The primitive Kratschmer reflex is medi-
ated through the trigeminal nerve and may result in life threatening reflex 
changes in autonomic, cardiovascular, and respiratory systems.  Effects include 
laryngospasm, bronchospam, respiratory arrest and depressed heart rate.  It is a 
known possible complication during surgery resulting from severe mucous 
                                                   
1
  Literature from the field of balneotherapy offer related mention, observing that therapeu-
tic baths in carbon dioxide enriched water also produces a subjective feeling of warmth.  
Schmidt (1989) studies indifference temperatures and reports that a 32 °C carbon dioxide 
bath is experienced as a 35 °C fresh water bath.  Hartmann et al. (1997) show that immer-
sion in CO2 enriched water produces local vasodilatation and increased cutaneous blood 
flow. Schmidt (1989) argues however, that the subjective feeling of warmth cannot be ex-
plained by vasodilatation alone, but must be caused by sensory nerve stimulation. 
2
  The thermal conductivity of air and CO2 is 0.0262 and 0.0166 respectively, i.e. the value 
of CO2 is 63% that of air.  Both properties are at 300 °K and atmospheric pressure, unit is 
W/m/°K.  Source: Perry and Green (1984) Table 3-314 
3
 Later tests revealed that the lamp was capable of detecting CO2 levels “above 15%” CO2 
only, and its use was discontinued (Pickert et al. 1980).  The source refers to a gasoline 
lamp, while retired miners informed they had carbide lamps. 
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membrane irritation caused by packing of the nasal passage (Nirmala et al. 
2006).  Early animal experiments exposing rabbits to 60-80% CO2 reported in-
stant powerful respiratory effects, combined with general extensor spasms of 
the greatest intensity, attributed to the Kratschmer reflex.  When the animals 
were allowed to breathe air again, recovery took place rapidly, first with spon-
taneous powerful movements of cramp-like nature (Hill and Flack 1908).   
The use of CO2 in abattoirs has been studied extensively.  Slaughtering is a 
process of bleeding an animal to death and it is a statutory requirement in many 
countries that animals be stunned prior to exsanguination (Becerril-Herrera et 
al. 2009).  CO2 stunning of pigs is popular since it requires less handling and 
allows higher throughput of animals compared with other methods (Hartung et 
al. 2008).  Pigs are typically guided into a gondola, which is lowered into a CO2 
pit.  When stunning in 80–90% CO2, loss of sensitivity and consciousness is 
said to be induced within about 30 seconds.  Pigs typically exhibit agitation 
with forced breathing, stretching the head upwards and vocalizing loudly at the 
beginning of gas stunning (Nowak et al. 2007).  Exposure time in the pit and 
the time lapse between stun and sticking (bleeding) are critical parameters as 
the animals can regain consciousness after exhalation of CO2.  For example, if 
stunned in 83% CO2 for 92 seconds and allowed a recovery period of 58 sec-
onds before sticking, more than a third of the pigs showed either a sensibility to 
pain or a righting reflex (Velarde et al. 2000). 
Accident case stories suggest that humans may also recover from exposure to 
extreme concentrations.  Many survivors of the Lake Nyos disaster, who awoke 
6 to 36 hours after losing consciousness, found that their oil lamps had gone 
out, although they still contained oil, and that their animals and family mem-
bers were dead (Kling et al. 1987).  Concentrations must at least briefly have 
exceeded 28% to extinguish the lamps.    Halpern et al. (2004) report a confined 
space industrial accident in an ice-making factory where impact damage to a 
discharge valve led to a sudden major CO2 discharge.  25 persons were exposed 
to almost 100 percent CO2 for a few seconds up to 1 minute before successfully 
reaching open air.  Within seconds, many of the exposed persons were inca-
pacitated and needed to be evacuated by co-workers.  All victims recovered 
fully.  
For the purposes of evaluating the consequences of the 1953 Menzengraben 
outburst concentration-effect relationships have been defined in Table 4.  It is 
clear that the effects cannot be explained from oxygen deficiency alone. 
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Concentration  (vol% ) Effect 
CO2 O2  
a
 
3  50 percent increase of breathing volume, threshold for laboured 
breathing to become conscious  
5  Four-fold increase of breathing volume, most individuals will re-
treat fearing for their lives 
7 19.5
 b
 Discomfort, dizziness and other effects of mental impairment 
become progressively more pronounced above this level 
10 18.9   Ten-fold increase of breathing volume, terror induced by laboured 
breathing will urge even the most determined individuals to re-
treat.  Ability to attempt to escape not seriously impaired.  Possi-
ble loss of consciousness after prolonged exposure.    
15 17.9   Loss of consciousness occurs in less than one minute.  Lower 
threshold for experiencing mucous membrane irritation.  Confu-
sion and possible membrane irritation may impede escape 
20 16.8
c
  Confusion or mucous membrane irritation will likely incapacitate 
victims making escape unlikely.  Death may ensue. 
30 14.7   Instant incapacitation.  Loss of consciousness occurs in less than 
30 seconds, convulsions within one minute. Death may ensue. 50 
percent of individuals will experience mucous membrane irrita-
tion. Flames extinguished, combustion engines stall 
>30  Unconsciousness and death; depending on exposure profile, some 
individuals may recover 
Table 4 CO2 concentration thresholds used as a basis for evaluating the conse-
quences of the 1953 Menzengraben outburst. 
a  Selected corresponding oxygen concentrations in regular air, com-
puted as (100-CCO2 )* 0.21, where CCO2 is vol% CO2. 
b  For a workplace, 19.5 vol% oxygen is the lower limit defining an 
oxygen-deficient atmosphere, the limit includes a safety factor (NIOSH 
2004) 
c  Value above 16 vol% oxygen, the lower limit for oxygen deficit (hy-
poxia) effects (NIOSH 2004) 
 
The extreme carbon dioxide outburst at the Menzengraben potash mine 7 July 1953 
C:\Documents and Settings\fhhe\My Documents\Frank\Artikler\01 Menzengraben\Safety Science\Menzen-53 submit (to Orbit).docx 
16 
.  
3 The 1953 outburst  
3.1 The Menzengraben mine, surroundings and 
topography 
The Menzengraben mine, GPS 50°47’34” N, 10°05’59”E  (#2 Shaft),  is lo-
cated in the Wartburgkreis of the state Thuringia (Thüringen) in the central part 
of Germany, in the Werra mining district.  At the time of the accident the area 
was part of the German Democratic Republic (DDR).  The mine is now closed. 
The Menzengraben mine is located on the western ridge of a valley roughly 
midway between the towns Stadtlengsfeld (distance 2.2 km) to the southeast 
and Dietlas (distance 2.8 km) to the northwest.  The NW-SE ridges rise some 
100-150 m to both sides and the valley lowlands slope gently from Stadtlengs-
feld towards Dietlas.  In the lowlands, the river Felda, a tributary to the Werra 
river, winds from SE to NW, never far away from the main road connecting 
Dorndorf-Dietlas-Stadtlengsfeld and a railroad line which connected Dorndorf 
and Kaltennordheim.   
In 1953 the mine was part of the Heiligenroda mining conglomerate.  Origi-
nally it was part of the Großherzog von Sachsen mines, with #1 Shaft sunk in 
Dietlas and #2 and #3 Shafts sunk in Menzengraben.  The Menzengraben shafts 
are located about 225 m apart, both have an internal diameter of 5.0 m.  The #2 
Shaft was used for ore hoisting and incoming ventilation, #3 Shaft for the per-
sonnel hoist and outgoing ventilation.   
Due to the history of serious CO2 outburst in the Menzengraben mine, the min-
ing authority (TBBI) in Erfurt had passed an order in 1949 forbidding blasting 
when personnel were below ground.  The order effectively mandated the use of 
electric detonators remotely controlled from above ground.  The blaster moni-
tored his work using a closed circuit microphone-loudspeaker system.  
Salt hoisted at Menzengraben was loaded onto rail cars for processing at the 
Dorndorf factory.  The local salt processing facilities known as the Old Factory 
were no longer in use.  Near the mine access road, two two-storey factory 
buildings had been converted to homes for employees, henceforth referred to as 
the Factory Settlement.  The majority of the miners lived in a settlement on the 
eastern side of the Felda, henceforth: the Menzengraben Settlement.   A bridge 
across the Felda connected the mine with the main road.  From the road junc-
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Figure 2 Excerpt of high altitude USAF aerial photo, dated 22.7.1945.  North is up.  Source: Photo mrk 
4518(4135-22), original scale 1:40,000. 
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 (Figure 2 and Figure 3). 
  
) 
The extreme carbon dioxide outburst at the Menzengraben potash mine 7 July 1953
C:\Documents and Settings\fhhe\My Documents\Frank
Figure 3 Excerpt of old topographical map of the Menzengraben mine and surrounding area. North is up, 
grid lines are 1,000x1,000 m.  Level indications for loca
from map, supplemented with observations from field visit in Aug. 2010, and compared with 
Google Earth, which appear
Edition 1955, Hessischen Lande
1:25,000. (Courtesy
TLVermGeo, Gen.-
 
3.2 
Primary sources on the 7 July 1953 outburst are sparse.  The key primary 
source is a
Heiligenroda mine manager Rudolf Junghans, dated 8th July 1953, i.e. the day 
after the accident, which 
sponse and an early damage assessment (
count was later published in the mining 
article (Junghans 1953b).  The emphasis of the article however, is on the da
age, the considerable difficulties in bringing the mine back into op
the nature of the potash seams considered responsible for the outburst.  
ticle holds
of events is often opaque.  The state
dent and
Freie Wort (DFW 19530709) covered the event under the headline of a “natural 
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 previously unpublished four-page company document
relates the sequence of events, the emergency r
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disaster” with a list of victims and which hospitals they were taken to.  The re-
gional edition brought the mine accident on the front page the following day 
(DFW 19530710) as did Thüringisches Landeszeitung (TL 19530710).  The 
descriptions appear to be based on Junghans’ first account and praise the emer-
gency response.  The local edition of Das Freie Wort carried death notices 
(DFW 19530716) and later reported a formal celebration of the emergency re-
sponders and awards given to individuals for outstanding performance and 
bravery (DFW 19530814). 
Except when otherwise indicated, the description below is based on Junghans’ 
accounts.  He also reported the weather conditions (Table 5). 
 
 23:30 01:00 04:00 07:00 
Wind speed SW 1 m/s SW 2 m/s WSW 7 m/s WSW 7 m/s 
Temperature (°C) 18 17.7 16.8 16.6 
Barometric pressure 
(mbar) 
1014 1014.1 1013.9 1014 
Humidity (%rel) 73% 75% 77% 81% 
Table 5 Meteorological conditions at the Kaltennordheim weather station, 22 
km south of Menzengraben, the night between 7 and 8 July 1953.  The 
sky was overcast and the weather dry.  Source: Junghans 1953b 
 
3.3 Sequence of events 
On the 7th July 1953 at 23:35, after having confirmed that everybody had left 
the mine, the blaster, Mr DK detonated the explosive charges in two rooms.  He 
duly monitored the blasting sequence over the microphone-loudspeaker system.  
“Immediately afterwards”, he heard an unusually large outburst.   
Interviewees stated that the blaster was located in the mine safety office.  Mr 
DK likely ran towards the porter’s lodge4, a distance of about 100 m, and 
alerted the porter, Ms AW, of an imminent gas danger. On his way, he would 
be passing the #2 Shaft House, the building erected above #2 Shaft.  There is no 
further mention of Mr DK but he probably ran about 30 m north, up a steep in-
cline, and escaped unharmed.  Ms AW sounded the factory siren.  The siren 
hardly wailed one cycle, however, before being silenced by a power failure due 
to a short circuit caused by impact damage to electrical installations below 
ground.  With the sky overcast the power failure left the mine and the two 
nearby settlements in complete darkness.  Gas then “came rushing up #2 Shaft 
with unprecedented force and blew a 10 m2 hole in the iron reinforced concrete 
ceiling of the #2 Shaft House.  The escaping gas sounded like four to five large 
                                                   
4
  Drawings show two possible porter lodges, one near the entrance to the mine premises 
(AG Kali 1950), and one located immediately east of the #2 Shaft House (VEB 1950).  Ac-
cording to interviewees the porter lodge near the entrance was not used, and a drawing 
(VEB 1950) indicates it may have served for residential purposes by 1953.   
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locomotives blowing steam at the same time accompanied by a deep rumbling 
undertone.  The sound lasted for about 25 minutes.”  It was wind still and “in a 
relatively short time the entire valley from Stadtlengsfeld to Dietlas was com-
pletely filled with concentrated carbon dioxide”.    
The inhabitants of the two settlements were initially bewildered by the wailing 
and then silenced siren, the electrical blackout and the noise of the escaping 
gas.  As soon as they realized the gas danger however, the people at the Factory 
Settlement fled across the bridge over the Felda and retreated to the safety of 
the heights of the eastern ridge.   
At the Menzengraben Settlement responses were quick and multiple.  Upon 
realizing the gravity of the situation, Mr H cycled to the nearest telephone in 
Stadtlengsfeld to alert the authorities in Dorndorf of the accident.  Mr N, the 
operations manager, discovered that the power failure had not disabled his 
home telephone line.  He sounded the disaster alarm, mobilized rescue teams of 
neighbour mines and alerted nearby hospitals and doctors.  Unaware that Mr H 
had already biked to Stadtlengsfeld, the operations manager dispatched a team 
of two messengers on foot to Stadtlengsfeld.  The inhabitants fled their homes 
up the eastern ridge.  Junghans praises the exemplary cold-headed behaviour of 
the people there “though many, clad only in nightgowns, barely saved their 
lives”.  
The police blocked the main road in Dietlas and in Stadtlengsfeld to stop un-
suspecting traffic entering the valley, and the Kaltennordheim passenger train 
in Dorndorf scheduled for departure 00:16 was halted.  “During the first 45 
minutes it was impossible to cross [from eastern heights] to the other side”.  
Several attempts by miners to cross over to the mine works had to be aborted.  
Just when a team was about to make a detour over the Schrammenhof in order 
to circumvent the Menzengraben intersection and the nearby lowlands, they 
met with the first recue vehicles arriving from the potash mine Heiligenroda 
I/III (located in Springen) and the gas emergency team from the Dorndorf fac-
tory.  Wearing breathing apparatus, the teams searched the vicinity of the Fac-
tory Settlement for victims.  “Shortly thereafter”, the mine manager, the party 
secretary, the factory doctor and the police arrived at the scene.  “At the same 
time”, Dr Klug of Stadtlengsfeld had set up a makeshift medical aid station at 
the main hotel, where he attended several casualties.  Dr Klug arrived “40 min-
utes later” at the provisional command centre, set up on a hill “west of Mr 
Koch’s house” and “southeast of the shaft yard”.  “Some 20 minutes later” two 
additional rescue teams from the potash mine Kaiseroda II/III arrived.  The 
teams searched the buildings of the Factory Settlement for victims.  At search 
team was also dispatched to the forest house.  Casualties were taken to nearby 
hospitals in Dermbach, Vacha and Bad Salzungen.  Three casualties were found 
in the canteen and taken to hospital.  “Meanwhile”, a rescue team wearing 
breathing apparatus carried out a systematic search of the Menzengraben shaft 
yard.  It was found to be almost gas free and additional victims were found.   
The power supply was restored and at 02:30 the command centre had been re-
located to the mine’s dining room.  More rescue teams arrived at the scene, a 
second team from Heiligenroda, a team from Kaiseroda I in Merkers and a team 
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All sources praise the rescue efforts for being swift, efficient and altruistic, but 
precise indications of time are mostly absent and the available information is 
insufficient for a firm reconstruction of the time
ing took place at 23:35 and the command centre was set up in the 
three hours later, at 02:30. 
The miners at the Menzengraben Settlement
office, where breathing apparatus were s
cross the main road 
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00:20.  They then retreated uphill and contemplated alternatives.    In the mean-
time the wind was picking up slightly.  The road may have been passable when 
they met with the first recue vehicles arriving from the direction of Dietlas.  . 
The rescue team from Springen and the gas emergency team from the Dorndorf 
factory likely met at 00:25  in Dietlas and were held back for briefing and in-
structions.  Junghans says that the recue teams were instructed to wear breath-
ing apparatus while advancing on the main road and that the western lowlands 
were considered dangerous.  They likely advanced cautiously, mindful of the 
gas danger.  They may have arrived at the Menzengraben intersection at 00:55, 
met with the miners of the Menzengraben Settlement and ventured over the 
bridge at 01:00.  Management may have arrived 01:05 and set up the first 
command centre on the hill perhaps at 01:30.  The victims in the forest house 
and the canteen may have been reached at about the same time, about two hours 
after the onset of the gas release.   
In all there were three fatalities.  Debris from the shattered concrete ceiling had 
struck the repair shop superintendent, Mr LS.  He was found dead in the yard 
west of the #2 Shaft House with serious head trauma.  The location is probably 
20-40 m from the #2 Shaft House   The last victim to be located, Mr PP, a 
craftsman, was found dead “northeast of the old factory” due to asphyxiation.  
The location is probably 275-300 m from the #2 Shaft House. He had been 
dead for at least one hour when found.  Mrs ErS, the wife of a worker, was one 
of three victims found “in the canteen”.  When found, her breathing was very 
troubled and she later died in hospital.  The two other victims there survived.  
One victim, Mr EuS, may have been her husband judging from the uncommon 
surname that they shared (DFW 19530709).  According to a newspaper ac-
count, Mrs ErS had been overcome by gas “in her home” (DFW 19530710).  
Interviewees stated that a family was living in the canteen building.  It is there-
fore concluded that Mrs ErS was indeed fatally affected by gas in the canteen 
about 100 m from #2 Shaft House, ruling out her having been in one of the 
buildings of the Factory Settlement, at a distance of 300 m.  Two workers, Mr 
OK and Mr GS were overcome by gas “near the Lamp House”, they both sur-
vived. The Lamp House is 10-15 m from #2 Shaft House.   
The local newspaper brought a list of nine victims taken to hospital with as-
phyxiation symptoms, three women and six men. (DFW 19530709).  They all 
recovered.  The fatally affected Mrs ErS who died in hospital is not on the list.  
The porter, Ms AW, who activated the factory siren was overcome by gas and 
lost consciousness.  Her name is on the list but there is no mention of when or 
where she was located.  The porter’s lodge is located about 10 m from #2 Shaft 
House.  She was later rewarded for bravery for having alerted the downhill set-
tlements of the gas danger (DFW 19530814).  The number of asphyxiation vic-
tims in the forest house, about 530 m from #2 Shaft House, is not stated but 
must amount to four.  A worker, Mr WS, suffered a broken leg while fleeing 
uphill in darkness.  There is no information on whether he was at work or if he 
fled from his home and he is not on the list.  There is no information about the 
people who received medical attention by Mr Klug at the main hotel in Stad-
tlengsfeld.  They may have included Mr H who came by bike and the messen-
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ger team on foot from the Menzengraben Settlement, and it may have been 
medical examination rather than medical treatment.   
It is remarkable that victims located in the immediate vicinity of the #2 Shaft 
House survived, while a victim succumbed hundreds of metres away.  A news-
paper account praises the actions of miners who at great personal risk retrieved 
unconscious victims and brought them to higher ground, “saving many lives” 
(DFW 19530709).  As described above, the rescue teams would have located 
the victims about two hours after the outburst began.  Medical attention given 
at such a late stage is unlikely to have much effect on a victim of asphyxiation, 
It is more plausible that the timely action by miners, accustomed to the dangers 
of carbon dioxide when working below ground, may have been decisive.  
An interviewee (born 1941) recalled that geese were found dead in the lowlands 
near the old Schneia Mill, where there was a farm.  From the main road there is 
a steep decline of about 4-5 m to the nearby Felda and the lowlands.  The dead 
geese indicate that concentrations in the lowlands, more than 1.2 km upstream 
of Menzengraben, had exceeded 20 percent.  It has not been possible to confirm 
or refute this observation independently.  Duchrow (1997) says that rescue ve-
hicles advancing from Dietlas were troubled by high concentrations of gas, 
which at times made the engines stall.  This would be a highly significant ob-
servation, as the concentration at road level would have been in excess of 28 
percent; concentrations that are instantly incapacitating and fatal.  Duchrow’s 
stated source is Junghans (1953b) but there is no mention of stalled engines in 
this source.  Interviewees stated that engine stalling was rare; it had happened 
below ground on certain diesel vehicles with low air-intake points5, but they 
had no knowledge of this happening above ground.  Duchrow has since passed 
away, and as it stands, his comment is unverifiable. Apart from the casualties at 
the forest house, there are no reports of effects of gas downstream of Menzen-
graben, towards Dietlas, possibly because nobody lived in that part of the val-
ley. 
To summarize, the carbon dioxide concentration likely exceeded 20 percent at 
the canteen 100 m away, where Mrs ErS was fatally affected and northeast of 
the old factory where Mr PP died 275-300 m away.  Asphyxiation victims were 
located in the forest house 530 m away, indicating that concentrations there ex-
ceeded 15 percent.  High concentrations of gas made it impossible to cross the 
main road intersection 450 m away, but there is no information on how miners 
determined that the concentrations were dangerous.  Assuming that the terror 
induced by laboured breathing discouraged them, the carbon dioxide concentra-
tion would have been 5-10 percent.  However, bearing in mind that asphyxia-
tion victims were located in the forest house, at roughly the same elevation but 
further away and cross-wind, it is conceivable that concentrations were higher, 
possibly 30 percent, capable of extinguishing an oil lamp.  An overview is pro-
vided in Table 6. 
 
                                                   
5
  There is very little mention of engines stalling in the literature.  Gimm (1954) reports that 
a moped stalled below ground, which provided the first warning of an impeding outburst. 
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Location Distance  
(m) 
Elevation 
a
 
(m) 
Victims Concentration 
vol% CO2 
Comment 
#2 Shaft House 0 290   Main source of CO2, near-vertical jet from roof  
Porter’s lodge 10 290 Ms AW >15% Unconscious, survived 
Lamp house 10-15 290 Mr OK  
Mr GS 
>15% Unconscious, survived 
#2 Shaft Yard 20-40  290 Mr LS unknown Died from head trauma, struck by debris from 
roof 
Canteen  
building 
100 270-280 Mrs ErS 
Mr EuS 
A victim 
>20% Died from asphyxiation 
Unconscious, survived 
Unconscious, survived 
Northeast of 
the old factory 
275-300 255-260 Mr PP >20% Died from asphyxiation 
 
Forrest house 530
b
 260 Four  
victims 
Probably  
>15% 
“Asphyxiation victims”, survived 
Main road near 
the Menzen-
graben intersec-
tion 
450 260 None Likely >10% 
Possibly > 
30% 
“Impossible to pass ” 
Menzengraben 
Settlement 
575 270-275 None Unknown People fled uphill, “barely saving their lives” 
Valley 2.5 km Potentially 
250-265 - 
None Unknown “Entire valley from Stadtlengsfeld to Dietlas” 
completely filled with “concentrated CO2. “   
Table 6 Overview of locations, distance and reported CO2 effects. 
a) Elevations are approximate only 
b) Estimated distance of cloud following terrain, direct path over a hill is only 400 m.  Location is 
cross-wind 
 
 
3.4 Material damage 
The gas came rushing up #2 Shaft with unprecedented force and shattered the 
roof before exiting “into the open air”.  Large amounts of splintered construc-
tion timber was scattered over “the entire area” up to 150 m from the #2 Shaft 
House.  “There is no doubt” that the main pathway of the gas to the surface was 
through #2 Shaft.  The other shaft only suffered “minor damage”; with some 
unspecified damage to the roof of the #3 Shaft House and the roof of the adja-
cent ventilation building.   
There was extensive damage to #2 Shaft House.  The shaft opening was partly 
covered by a 8-10 mm steel deck plate, of which the entire eastern section over 
the ventilation compartment was torn and bent upwards.  Above, there was a 10 
m2 hole in the iron reinforced roof (Figure 5).  
The eastern elevator cage was at the bottom, and the western cage at surface 
level.  Gas coming up the cage compartment deformed various U and T-steel 
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beams of the hoist frame and then continued straight up where it blew out the 
wooden cladding of the hoist frame.  Figure 6 shows the wooden cladding, with 
at least one side blown out, and the hole in the roof in the foreground.  Gas also 
impinged on the underside of the western cage and severed the tail cable.     
Figure 7 shows the damage inside the #2 Shaft House.  Large pieces of con-
struction timber, parts from the ventilation and the cage compartments, lumps 
of concrete and iron beams are scattered around.  The window frames and per-
haps even some windows appear intact, indicative that the overpressure inside 
the building was minimal.   
The most plausible interpretation of the damage is that the gas stream coming 
up the ventilation compartment continued straight up, destroyed the roof, 
stayed clear of the hoist frame and exited freely into the open air.  A plot plan 
(Figure 4) shows that the hoist machinery was located east of the shaft house.  
It could therefore be speculated that gas impinged on the inclined back leg, 
most likely an open truss girder structure.  Junghans says specifically, that there 
was no damage to the outdoor parts of the hoist frame, indicating that im-
pingement may have been minimal, if it happened at all.  The gas stream com-
ing up the cage compartment clearly impinged but had sufficient force to con-
tinue straight up, blow out the wooden cladding and exit vertically into open 
air.   
Based on a low-detail drawing6, the cross-sectional area of the ventilation com-
partment is estimated to be 5.77 m2.  The cage footprint was 2.31 m2.  Assum-
ing that the gas could not push the western cage upwards (empty weight 2.5 
tonnes), and allowing 10% for clearances, the maximum free cross sectional 
area at ground level available for the gas jet can be estimated at  5.77+1.1*2.31 
= 8.31 m2.   
In conclusion, the primary pathway of the gas stream was an almost vertical 
mostly unobstructed jet through the hole in the roof of the #2 Shaft House, with 
secondary venting up through the blown out wooden panel(s) of the hoist frame 
partly obstructed by structural steel members, and probably some minor tertiary 
diffuse venting through shattered windows.  Additional venting took place 
through the #3 Shaft House, the damage there was light suggesting that the 
venting was of minor magnitude. 
 
                                                   
6
  Drawing and other technical data are taken from a summary technical data sheet for sev-
eral mines, marked “W 1.3 02 00 002” (ZM40500) kindly provided by Dipl. Ing. Hartmut 
Ruck. 
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Figure 5 Looking down the shattered concrete roof of #2 Shaft House into the 
completely destroyed ventilation compartment.  Legend: a) wooden 
cladding of the hoist frame; b) hoist frame lattice steel structure; c) 
ground level with debris; d) large deck plate, bent vertically upwards; 
e) intact deck plate; (photo from Hohmann and Mehnert 2004). 
 
 
Figure 6 Photo taken from the roof of #2 Shaft House, facing southwest.  Legend: 
a) hoist frame with at least one side (north) of the wooden cladding 
blown out; b) hole in the concrete roof where the gas jet exited into the 
open air; c) possibly part of the inclined back leg, (photo from Jung-
hans 1953b) 
 
 
b 
c 
d N 
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a 
c 
b 
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Figure 7 The inside of #2 Shaft House, facing south.  Legend: a) steel deck plate 
bent upwards; b) snapped construction timber; c) side of the cage struc-
ture; d) intact window frames (photo from Junghans 1953b). 
 
There was extensive damage below ground.  The compartment dividers in #2 
Shaft were destroyed and about two-thirds of the cross-sectional beams an-
chored in the shaft wall were torn out.  Destruction in the tunnel system com-
prised overturned and deformed conveyor cars, rail tracks twisted and bent up-
wards with the sleepers (ties) torn off, and extensive destruction of electrical 
cabling and ventilation equipment.  Excerpts from the damage description 
reads: 50% of the conveyor cars destroyed, 2.5 km of twin-track rails to be laid, 
and three wire-drawn ore scraper units entirely destroyed.  It took 12 weeks to 
bring the mine back into production. 
3.5 Outburst cavity size and salt burst amount  
Early inspections revealed a cavity about 60 m long, 12-15 m wide and 6-12 m 
high, but measurements were hindered by the presence of pockets of concen-
trated CO2. The salt burst was estimated to be 18,000 tonnes (Junghans 1953b).  
The outburst initiated in a transition zone between carnallite and sylvite, with a 
seam of secondary sylvite (Umwandlungssylvinit), the cavity extending into the 
sylvite.  Later, Junghans (1955) provided revised estimates, a detailed survey 
showed that the cavity length was 140 m with an average width of 10 m, and 
the salt burst amounted to 65,000 tonnes.  Duchrow (1959) argues that the cav-
ity may have been larger and speculates that the likely salt burst was 100,000 
tonnes, perhaps even multiples of that. 
 
a 
d 
b c
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3.6 Determination of amount of CO2 released 
3.6.1 Direct estimation of the outburst size 
Junghans (1953b) says that the exact outburst size escapes precise estimation 
and “can only be based on conjecture”.  The outburst intensity clearly exceeded 
the normal mine ventilation rate of about 2,500-3,500 m3/min and, at this flow 
rate, he observes, there is hardly any noise from the diffuser of the mine venti-
lator.  “It can therefore safely be presumed that at least 12,000 m3/min of gas 
flowed to the surface during the outburst […therefore….]  about 300,000 m3 of 
CO2 were vented during the first 25 minutes.  In addition, the entire mine, with 
a volume of about 480,000 m3, was left flooded with concentrated CO2.  The 
outburst size can therefore be estimated to about 700,000 m3” (Junghans 
1953b:461-462).   
Without going into detail, Junghans’ account reveals the extremely approxi-
mate nature of assessing the outburst size in the absence of instrument readings.   
3.6.2 Estimation based on key ratios derived from other 
outbursts  
For some outbursts (Table 3), estimates of gas volumes and salt burst amounts 
are available, which permits computation of a key ratio of cubic metres of CO2 
per tonne of salt.  Hoppe (1960:109) provides a range of 11-45 m3/t for the 
Werra district, based on data from Müller (1958).  Bearing in mind the difficul-
ties and uncertainties in estimating both the salt burst and the gas volume for 
the 1953 outburst, such ratios should be viewed with caution.  
Only one source has been identified, which reports actual measurements of 
outbursts.  Mr Hubert Wolf followed the blasting teams in three mines and set 
up instruments in the tunnel system to record gas velocity and overpressure 
profiles, should blasting trigger an outburst.  He documented the results in a 
doctoral dissertation (Wolf 1965).  Wolf’s measurements confirm the hypothe-
sis, that an outburst is the superimposition of numerous smaller outbursts, the 
result of a chain reaction over time, not a single massive release of CO2.  His 
results for the Menzengraben mine are presented in Table 7.   
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 Date   Salt   CO2   Ratio   Duration  Intensity Pressure 
      avg   max   avg   max  
 tonnes Nm
3
 Nm
3
/ton  sec Nm
3
/sec Nm
3
/sec Pa Pa 
 14 Jan 1962   8,000   122,000   15.3   165   740   1,390   2,300   35,500  
 18 Mar 1962   300   2,750   9.2   17   165   430   540   1,560  
 1 Oct 1962   300   5,880   19.6   30   197   385   130   360  
 10 Oct 1962   600   12,100   20.2   41   300   580   270   730  
 22 Nov 1962   2,000   24,800   12.4   52   477   1,220   2,900   7,600  
 29 Jan 1963   600   4,950   8.3   15   330   700   670   3,150  
 2 Mar 1963   900   8,850   9.8   25   354   540   1,700   2,180  
 22 Mar 1963   5,500   74,900   13.6   150   500   1,230   3,350   7,600  
 23 Apr 1963   20,000   300,000   15.0   150   2,000   - 
a
    - 
a
    86,500  
Table 7 Measurements of major carbon dioxide outbursts in the Menzengraben mine provoked by blasting 
work.  Pressure readings are included to give an idea of orders of magnitude only, as they are 
influenced by the specifics of instrument location, tunnel geometry, etc. (Nm3refers to normal cubic 
metres).  Source: Wolf 1965:54.   
a  Not available due to instruments damaged by outburst.  
 
The outburst 23 Apr 1963 is remarkable for its magnitude and severity, which 
unfortunately destroyed many of Wolf’s instruments.  Gas came up both shafts 
for several minutes.  Large boulders of salt took down 10 mm steel doors.  A 
ventilation lock 900 m away was destroyed, instruments behind the lock were 
blown 50 m down the tunnel and destroyed, and damage to electrical installa-
tions caused a power failure.  Instruments located behind a protective door that 
withstood the overpressure survived (Wolf 1965).   
For lack of better data it may be assumed, that the 23 Apr 1963 outburst was 
similar in nature to the 7 Jul 1953 outburst.  Both outbursts cavities extended 
into a sylvite deposit.   Drop doors were installed after the 1953 outburst (Jung-
hans 1958) and by 1963 the mine volume had increased four-fold to 2 mio. m3 
(Wolf 1965).  These factors plus the much shorter outburst duration may ex-
plain the less severe damage.  Using Junghans’ original salt burst amount of 
65,000 ton, and the 23 Apr 1963 outburst ratio of 15 Nm3/t, the 1953 outburst 
computes to 0.975 mio. Nm3.  Using Duchrow’s revised salt amount of 100,000 
ton, the 1953 outburst computes to 1.5 mio. Nm3.  
Wolf’s measurements introduce a new parameter, the average outburst intensity 
in normal cubic metres of CO2 per second. This parameter is useful, because it 
allows estimation of the outburst size directly from the outburst duration, i.e. 
eliminating uncertainties associated with the estimation of the amount of ex-
pelled salt.  For the 23 Apr 1963 outburst, the average intensity was 2,000 
Nm3/s.  Junghans (1953b) says the escaping gas could be heard for 25 minutes.  
It would take some time for the mine to depressurize after the outburst has ter-
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minated and until escaping gas can no longer be heard.  Assuming a duration of 
20 minutes the outburst computes to 2.4 mio. Nm3.   
The outburst volume relates to the amount of CO2 liberated from the evaporite 
minerals.  Some of the CO2 will remain below ground.  Three days after the 
outburst, the  #3 Shaft bottom CO2 concentration was measured to be 86% 
(Junghans 1953b).  Assuming homogeneous mixing, adjusting for static head 
and temperature of the mine (17-19 °C), some 436,000 Nm3 of CO2  remained 
below ground.  Table 8 presents five different estimates of the amount of CO2 
emitted from the mine shaft.    
Source Comment Method for estimating 
CO2 outburst volume 
CO2  
outburst 
Nm
3
 
CO2 left  
in mine 
Nm
3
 
CO2  
ejected 
Nm
3
 
CO2  
ejected 
tonnes 
In: Junghans 
1953b 
Salt burst measured 
to 65,000 t 
Original extremely crude 
assessment (inaccurate) 
700,000 436,000 264,000 518 
In: Duchrow 
1997 
Salt burst stated to 
be 100,000 t 
No explanation offered 1,000,000 436,000 564,000 1,107 
From: Wolf 
1965 
Measured ratio of 15 
Nm
3
/t salt 
Assuming salt burst of 
65,000 t 
975,000 436,000 539,000 1,058 
From: Wolf 
1965 
Measured ratio of 15 
Nm
3
/t salt 
Assuming salt burst of 
100,000 t 
1,500,000 436,000 1,064,000 2,089 
From: Wolf 
1965 
Measured average 
intensity of 2,000 
Nm
3
/s 
Assuming a duration of 
20 minutes 
2,400,000 436,000 1,964,000 3,855 
Table 8 Five different estimates of the amount of CO2 emitted from the mine shaft.  The possible range is 
1,100 - 3,900 tonnes. 
 
3.7 Dispersion modelling 
Dispersion modelling was carried out using PHAST version 6.54 to compare 
the consistency of predicted concentrations levels with observed harm, in par-
ticular asphyxiation harm. Ideally this could help to determine which of the 
three outburst sizes would be the most likely.   
During the outburst, the liberated CO2 will purge some sections of the mine and 
entrap, compress and mix with tunnel air in inner sections of the mine in a 
complex manner which cannot be quantified.  Gas ejected from the mine shaft 
will first be displaced air, then increasingly concentrated CO2, possibly fol-
lowed by less concentrated CO2 as the inner sections of the mine depressurizes.  
Simplifications are required in order to apply the PHAST model.  The source 
term is modelled as a continuous release of pure CO2 similar to the outburst 
intensity, assuming an effective outburst duration of 20 minutes.  Because the 
actual release was not pure CO2 this simplification is conservative and will tend 
to overestimate cloud contours. 
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While the main route to the surface was clearly through #2 Shaft, some gas was 
also vented through #3 Shaft through an unspecified hole.  The destructive re-
lease through #2 shaft was obviously highly turbulent.  The minor damage to 
#3 shaft indicates that gas velocities there were more modest.  Therefore, two 
source terms are modelled in PHAST: a large un-impinged high-momentum 
release through  #2 Shaft and a smaller low-momentum release through #3 
Shaft.  Due to absence of data, it is arbitrarily assumed that the split was 90% 
and 10%.  This simplification serves to examine the overall behaviour of a 
large near-vertical turbulent jet and a much smaller near-vertical low-velocity 
gas release.  The high- momentum release is modelled as an infinite reservoir 
of CO2, at 18 °C, a circular orifice with an area of 8.31 m
2 and adjusting the 
reservoir pressure to fit the outburst intensity.  There is no information on the 
release from #3 Shaft and in the absence of an orifice area estimate the low-
momentum release is arbitrarily defined as having an exit velocity of 10 m/s.  
Both source terms are set at 8 m height, the assumed elevation of the roof of the 
Shaft Houses, slightly deviated from vertical (10°) towards the east.  Meteoro-
logical conditions are defined as wind speed 1 m/s, overcast conditions at night 
is specified as Pasquill stability class D, ambient temperature 18°C and a sur-
face roughness parameter representative of a  suburb/forest.  PHAST does not 
allow specification of topography. 
PHAST outputs for the three scenarios are qualitatively similar.  Invariably, the 
high-momentum releases from #2 Shaft are predicted to  disperse safely, inca-
pable of cause harm at ground level.  The low-momentum releases from #3 
Shaft would quickly slump to the ground.  Only the largest release scenario will 
produce concentrations above 15% at ground level.  The range is limited and is 
less than the distance between the two shafts.  The shaft gas velocity was esti-
mated by using the reservoir pressure to compute the shaft gas density, and as-
suming full bore flow.  Results are summarized in Table 9.  Since model out-
puts were qualitatively similar, only plots for scenario 3 are presented in Figure 
8 and Figure 9 - for better visualization the axes are scaled. 
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Sce-
nario 
 
Outburst 
volume 
(Nm
3
) 
Source 
term 
(kg/s) 
Est. 
back  
pressure 
(kPa) 
Orifice 
area 
(m
2
) 
Est. exit  
velocity 
(m/s) 
Est. exit 
temp 
(°C) 
Est. 
shaft 
velocity 
(m/s) 
Est. distance (m) to CO2  
concentration 
5% 10% 15% 20% 
High-momentum release from roof of #2 Shaft House, 90% of outburst intensity 
1a 975,000 1,435 121 8.31
a
 139 6 31 -
 d
 -
 d
 -
 d
 -
 d
 
2a 1,500,000 2,208 146 8.31
a
 195 -6 40 -
 d
 -
 d
 -
 d
 -
 d
 
3a 2,400,000 3,533 198 8.31
a
 260
b
 -24 47 -
 d
 -
 d
 -
 d
 -
 d
 
Low-momentum release from roof of #3 Shaft House, 10% of outburst intensity 
1b 975,000 159 -
 c
 -
 c
 10
a
 18
a
 4 210 95 -
 d
 -
 d
 
2b 1,500,000 245 -
 c
 -
 c
 10
a
 18
a
 6 275 160 10 -
 d
 
3b 2,400,000 393 -
 c
 -
 c
 10
a
 18
a
 10 365 240 160 -
 d
 
Table 9 Release scenarios and dispersion model outputs.  
a value set to define scenario  
b sonic release (choked flow) 
c value not relevant for scenario 
d concentration contour does not reach ground level 
 
 
Figure 8 Scenario 3a - large high-momentum release..  Plot shows 5, 10, 15 and 
20 vol% CO2 plume concentration contours.  Jet is predicted to dilute safely. 
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Figure 9 Scenario 3b - small low-momentum release. Plot shows 5, 10, 15 and 
20 vol% CO2 plume concentration contours. Predicted ground level concentra-
tions  are 15 vol% @ 160 m, 10 vol% @ 240 m. 
 
The principal interest concerns the dispersion result for the main CO2 release.  
For a high-momentum release, an essential parameter in PHAST is the nozzle 
exit velocity, which is determined from the release rate and the orifice area.  
Sensitivity analysis shows that gravity effects only become apparent at nozzle 
exit velocities below about 50 m/s and that significant touch down of the CO2 
plume takes place at exit velocities below about 30 m/s.  Plots for scenario 1a 
and 3a are shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11, results for scenario 2a are qualita-
tively similar and not shown due to space restrictions. The estimated nozzle exit 
velocities for the three outburst sizes (Table 9) are well above these values.  
The dispersion modelling results are therefore robust to considerable variation 
in both outburst size and orifice area, two important but uncertain inputs. 
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Figure 10 Scenario 1a, sensitivity analysis.  Exit nozzle velocity set to  50, 40, 30 
and 20 m/s.  Plot shows 10 vol% CO2 plume contours. 
 
 
Figure 11 Scenario 3a, sensitivity analysis.  Exit nozzle velocity set to  50, 40, 30 
and 20 m/s.  Plot shows 10 vol% CO2 plume contours. 
 
PHAST takes loss of momentum due to obstacle impingement into account by 
specifying a reduced “nozzle” velocity, which reflects the presumed release 
velocity after impingement has taken place.  PHAST applies a velocity modifi-
cation factor, which defaults to 0.25 for impinged releases, i.e. the jet is as-
sumed to lose 75 percent of its nozzle exit velocity.  There is no evidence sug-
gesting that significant impingement took place, but even if impingement were 
assumed, PHAST model output indicates that the large release would disperse 
safely. 
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4 Discussion 
Temporary Emergency Exposure Limits (TEEL) and Immediately Dangerous 
to Life or Health (IDLH) end-points are regularly used in risk analysis studies.  
For CO2, the values seem to define protection from harm rather than harm it-
self, employing unstated safety factors.  Using risk terminology, protection 
from harm translates into a low probability of harm; a probability, which if un-
accounted for, may distort estimated risks systematically.  Because accident 
reports usually specify harm, not absence of harm, other end-points are required 
for analysis of reported effects.  This would be particularly true for the1953 
outburst which affected a miner’s community, presumably healthy adults, for 
whom large safety factors would seem unwarranted. 
The largest evaporite CO2 outbursts on record have taken place in the Werra 
potash mining district.  Key data are often lacking.  Specific instrumentation, 
e.g. a CO2 gas analyzer in the exit ventilation stream in combination with a 
flow meter, is required to estimate outburst volumes routinely and reliably.  For 
old CO2 outbursts, only crude assessments of outburst volumes are available, if 
at all, and the computation procedure is rarely stated.  The priority was progno-
sis work; to reliably predict the outburst potential of the underground and act 
accordingly to protect people and limit damage.  The focus was clearly outburst 
risk management, less so outburst volume estimation. 
Outburst volumes can in principle be computed from the amount of expelled 
salt and an assumed ratio of gas per tonne of salt.  Reported ratios exhibit a 
large variation however.  Also, only the amount of salt hauled to the surface is 
known reliably, which is a problem particularly for large outbursts where the 
cavity may be unsafe to access or the innermost salt deemed too laborious to 
extract.  There is also the complication, that low or inner cavities can be buried 
under piles of expelled salt and remain undetected.  In the more recent litera-
ture, the consensus seems to be that the 7 July 1953 salt burst was 100,000 ton-
nes (Duchrow 1997) and that typical ratios are 10-15 Nm3/t (Duchrow et al. 
1988).  The problem is that the 100,000 tonnes salt burst is based on specula-
tion and that the amount measured by Junghans (1953b) is only 65,000 tonnes.  
Because Junghans’ lower value was challenged relatively soon after publication 
(Duchow 1959) and because the 140 m long cavity was indeed very difficult to 
access (Junghans 1955), the 100,000 tonnes estimate is probably the best avail-
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able7.  The best estimate for the ratio is provided by Wolf (1965).  Using the 
salt-ratio method, the best outburst estimate is 1.5 mio. Nm3 of CO2.   
Wolf (1965) reports an extremely violent outburst in the Menzengraben mine in 
1963, which had many similarities with the 1953 outburst.  Despite the outburst 
destroying many of Wolf’s instruments, he nevertheless provided an estimate of 
the outburst volume of 300,000 Nm3 (Table 7).  This round figure may hint that 
it is indeed a very crude estimate.  Using the intensity method, the 1953 out-
burst estimates to  2.4 mio. Nm3.  Interviewees state that such large outbursts 
are rare, but not unheard of.  An outburst in 1984, presumably when suitable 
instrumentation was available, is reported to 2.3 mio. m3 (Table 3).  The upper 
estimate is therefore possible, it is within the experience base, but the likeli-
hood is impossible to assess. 
The average velocity of the gas in #2 Shaft computes to 31-47 m/s (Table 9).  
This is comparable to hurricane force wind speeds, category one (33-42 m/s) or 
two (43-49 m/s) according to the Saffir–Simpson Scale.  Such winds are known 
to cause destruction, uprooting trees, damaging buildings and hurling debris 
around.  The #2 Shaft contained compartment dividers made of wood which 
were completely destroyed.  It seems plausible that gas travelling at hurricane 
force wind speeds expelled the construction materials with great force from the 
shaft opening.  It must have been projectiles of timber that shattered the iron 
reinforced concrete roof, bent the steel deck plate upwards and deformed steel 
beams, not the gas itself.   
A high-velocity gas jet is a very significant generator of noise.  Broadband 
noise is generated due to turbulence and shearing stresses as the high-velocity 
gas interacts with the ambient air.  The velocity of a gas jet attains a maximum 
value, the speed of propagation of sound in the gas, when the ratio of the orifice 
back pressure and the ambient pressure become sufficiently high; the flow is 
said to be sonic (or choked).  The 1953 outburst sounded  “like four to five 
large locomotives blowing steam at the same time accompanied by a deep rum-
bling undertone” (Junghans 1953b:458).  Large steam locomotives are certainly 
operated at pressures high enough for steam blowing to result in sonic flow 
suggesting that the 1953 outburst gave rise to a sonic release.  Some uncertainty 
arises however, because the forceful expulsion of construction timber will also 
generate considerable noise.  .   
Standard dispersion modelling with conservative inputs predicts that the high-
momentum release from the roof of #2 Shaft House dilutes safely and never 
reaches ground.  The low-momentum release from the roof of #3 Shaft House, 
about 220 m behind #2 Shaft,  is predicted to produce ground-hugging clouds 
with dangerously high concentrations, though with limited reach.  Interpretation 
                                                   
7
  When the 1953 outburst area was mined again in 1988/89 from the opposite side, i.e. 
from the east, a new branch of the 1953 cavity was discovered, confirming the speculation 
of Duchrow (1959) that the cavity was indeed extending further inwards.  Consensus seem 
to be that the 1953 cavity length exceeded 200 m, that the salt amount was closer to 
100,000 t than to 65,000 t, and the likely outburst volume was 1.5 mio m
3
.  (Personal com-
munication, Dr. P Marggraf, e-mail 29.3.2011) 
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of predicted concentration contours is not straightforward. Carbon dioxide eas-
ily stratifies because of its high density and it may flow by gravity following 
the local topography.  The Shaft Yard is sloping slightly, and the slope is 
steeper where the canteen was located.  Still, the predicted concentration con-
tours cannot possibly explain the harm observed.  Dispersion modelling output 
thus suggests that the gas cloud that filled the “entire valley from Stadtlengsfeld 
to Dietlas” with carbon dioxide can only originate from the smallest release and 
the largest release disperses safely, a counter-intuitive result.   
The PHAST dispersion result does not appear to be in disagreement with other 
CO2 dispersion modelling studies.  As described above, studies using SLAB 
and CFD tools also predict that large horizontal high-momentum releases 
would dilute rapidly, surely even more so in case of a vertical release.  It ap-
pears that the forceful and destructive 1953 outburst for unexplained reasons 
behaved as a low-momentum release.   It may be speculated that  #2 Shaft 
House was a source of some low-momentum emissions.   The observed exten-
sive damage there however, is consistent with a very forceful vertical expul-
sion.  There may have been some impingement with the hoist frame but the 
evidence available indicates a relatively open truss-girder construction.  The 
scattering of splintered construction timber within a radius of 150 m is also in-
dicative that flow velocities were high and not particularly obstructed.  The dis-
crepancies are unresolved.  
The topography of the area may have played a role, in particular the shielded 
location of the mine, on a hillside in a forest clearing, and the sloping terrain 
towards the valley bottom.  The meteorological conditions were also adverse, 
with almost no wind, but no inversion layer.  Such conditions are only to be 
expected however, and can obviously also be present at future accidental re-
leases elsewhere.  Specifically, it may be speculated if the artificial ridges and 
valleys of modern urban environments could produce comparable topographi-
cal conditions. 
In other respects the circumstances were highly favourable, exposing a com-
munity of miners, presumably mostly healthy adults, who knew the dangers of 
carbon dioxide, had extensive practical experience with working in potentially 
hazardous carbon dioxide environments below ground and with an intact com-
mand structure.  They quickly decided to flee and seek higher ground, in a 
coolheaded and organized manner, and the nearby hillsides offered plenty of 
escape options.  The two asphyxiation fatalities were non-miners. 
Mr PP was killed by asphyxiation at distance 275-300 m, a remarkably large 
distance.  For sake of perspective, Baldock (1980) reviewed reported incidents 
with ammonia, including the catastrophic failure of large pressurized storage 
tanks, and concluded that nobody appears to have been killed at a distance 
greater than 200 m.  If scored on confirmed ability to cause deadly harm, this 
brings carbon dioxide in the company of far more toxic industrial bulk chemi-
cals.   
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5 Conclusion 
Accidental releases of large quantities of CO2 may provide an empirical per-
spective on predictive dispersion modelling.  The extreme 1953 carbon dioxide 
outburst at Menzengraben fills a gap in the available accident history with an 
estimated release amount of 1,100-3,900 tonnes, almost two orders of magni-
tude larger than the largest industrial accidents currently on record.  This is par-
ticularly relevant as releases of this magnitude may occur in the event of a 
transmission pipeline rupture associated with carbon dioxide capture and stor-
age (CCS).   
Evidence suggests that the Menzengraben outburst gave rise to a vertical high-
momentum release with little impingement.  There is a body of literature on the 
application of dispersion modelling techniques, which predicts that jet effects 
would rapidly dilute the carbon dioxide to harmless levels.  Dispersion was 
modelled using PHAST, a widely used commercially available tool for hazard 
analysis.  PHAST also predicts that the large energetic near-vertical expulsion 
of carbon dioxide from the Menzengraben mine shaft would disperse safely and 
never reach ground.  This model output seems to be incorrect in the face of re-
ports, that an entire valley several kilometres long was filled with dangerous 
concentrations of carbon dioxide.  Model output is inconsistent with observed 
fatal asphyxiation harm.  For model output to come into agreement with ob-
served harm it would have to be assumed that the release behaved as a low-
momentum jet. 
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